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II.—ON RECENT STUDIES IN HINDU GRAMMAR.

Nine years ago (in October, 1884) I published in this Journal a paper entitled "The study of Hindu grammar and the study of Sanskrit." It was intended to emphasize the difference between Sanskrit on the one side and Pāṇini with his successors on the other, and to point out the true place of the native grammar as an important division of Sanskrit science, requiring to be studied as such, and not as the foundation of our knowledge of the Sanskrit language. Since that time there have appeared a number of contributions to our knowledge of the Hindu grammar, from the pens of two younger scholars of decided ability, then unknown; and these contributions I propose to examine briefly, especially in order to see how they stand related to the question above set forth.

The first of them appeared in 1885, and was entitled "The case-system of the Hindu grammarians, compared with the use of the cases in the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa"; it was a doctorate-dissertation by Bruno Liebich; the author is at present a *privat-docent* in the Breslau University. Its first part, printed in vol. X of Bezzenberger's *Beiträge zur Kunde der indogermanischen Sprachen*, was a digest of the system of rules laid down by Pāṇini for the use of the cases, and was very welcome, as must be every contribution to an easier understanding of the peculiarities and difficulties of the Hindu science. A few words as to the system may not be out of place here. Pāṇini does not take up the cases as forms of nouns, setting forth the various uses of each, after our manner; he adopts the vastly more difficult and dangerous method of establishing a theoretical list of modes of verb-modification by case, or of ideal case-relations (he calls them *kāraka*, 'factor' or 'adjunct'), to which he then distributes the cases. Almost as a matter of course, however, his case-relations or *kāraka* are not an independent product of his logical faculty, but simply a reflection of the case-forms; they are of the same number as the latter, and each corresponds to the general sphere of a case: they are *kartar* ('actor' = nominative), *karman* ('act' = accusative), *sampradāna* ('delivery' = dative), *karāṇa* ('instru-

ment' = instrumental), *adhikaraṇa* ('sphere' = locative), and *apādāna* ('removal' = ablative). The genitive has no defined character, but is provided for by stating, when all the other case-uses have been rehearsed, that the remainder are those of the genitive. As for the definitions of the case-relations, it may suffice to say that the *karman* is described as belonging, first, to that which the actor in his action especially desires to obtain or attain (as in "he makes a *mat*," "he goes to the *village*"); or, second, to that which, though itself undesired or indifferent, is connected with the action in a similar manner. Anything more crude or unphilosophical than this could not well be imagined. There is not an identity between the use of a given case and the presence of its generally corresponding case-relation, because, for example, in a passive sentence, as "the mat is made by him," *mat* is still called *karman* or 'act,' though nominative, and *him* still *kartar* or 'actor,' though instrumental. Thus there is no recognition of the grammatical category of subject of a verb; and this leads, as could not be helped, to numerous obscurities and difficulties. Then, in the second part of the paper (*ibid.*, vol. XI, 1887), the author proceeds to classify under this scheme, in all its headings and sub-headings, its general rules and its exceptions, the facts of case-use in the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa: a careful and creditable piece of work. The results of the comparison are precisely what we should expect to find them, knowing well, as we do, the relation of the language of the Brāhmaṇas to Pāṇini's Sanskrit: there is a good degree of general agreement—as there would have been found to exist even if the Rig-Veda instead of a Brāhmaṇa had been compared; since changes of syntactical construction, perhaps even more than changes of form, are of slow progress in every language, leaving the main body of older usages long untouched. Alongside of this agreement are met with just the differences that could not fail to appear: constructions in the Brāhmaṇa that are unnoticed in Pāṇini, as they are wanting in classical Sanskrit; and especially a host of details in Pāṇini of which the Brāhmaṇa exhibits no examples. There is absolutely nothing to show, or even to give reason to suspect, that any special relation exists between Pāṇini and this Brāhmaṇa any more than any other of the same class of works, specimens alike of the Brāhmaṇa stage of development of ancient Indian language. The conclusion is that, whatever its defects of theory, Pāṇini's case-syntax proves to be a fairly good practical scheme; and the

demonstration of the fact is to be received with thanks; it is a valuable contribution to our appreciation of the great grammarian. Whether, however, the author views it in just this light is a little questionable; for he adds as second title to his essay "a contribution to the syntax of the Sanskrit language"—which it plainly is not. Is it, forsooth, the *Brāhmaṇa* that he has been examining, to see whether its case-constructions are such as they ought to be? or is this part of its grammar now better understood than hitherto, or arranged in a manner which we shall be disposed to accept as preferable to, for example, Delbrück's? Nothing of all this; it is simply that Pāṇini has been tested by a bit of real language, and the test has turned out not to his disadvantage. The misapprehension that something done for Pāṇini is done for the Sanskrit language is precisely what my former paper was especially intended to discourage.

Dr. Liebich adds at the end his own estimate of the results of his work: "1. The *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* is older than Pāṇini." This were better stated the other way: namely, that Pāṇini is later than the *Brāhmaṇa*; since it is really the grammarian, and not this member of the literature, that is under examination. As for the relation itself, it is not only true, but a truism; no one having any knowledge of the subject has or could have any question about it; our author's paper is not a demonstration, but merely an illustration, out of one department of grammar, of a fact already incontrovertibly established on many and sufficient grounds. The author adds as follows: "It [the *Brāhmaṇa*] belongs to the Vedic period, but to the close of the latter, and stands fairly near to Pāṇini (undoubtedly much nearer than to the *Rig-Veda* in the other direction)." Here again we have truths, but, since there has been no comparison made between *Brāhmaṇa* and *Veda* in the paper, they are incorrectly put forward as its "results." Further, "2. The doctrine of Pāṇini reposes upon a careful and acute observation of the actual language." Here it is a little doubtful where the stress of the assertion lies, and what counter-proposition is intended to be gainsaid. No one, certainly, would think of denying that Pāṇini observed and described with remarkable acuteness and to the best of his ability. Nor, again, I should think, that he described an actual language—"an" rather than "the," for just what language he was dealing with is one of the disputed points. The author's added remarks indicate that he thinks it a book-language; if anything in the rules is not

capable of being instanced, it is, he suggests, because so much of the literature has been lost. This seems an untenable view, and has doubtless been since abandoned by him. The question will come up again further on.

Four years later (1890), in the same Journal (XVI 1-2), a kindred topic is taken up by another scholar, Dr. R. Otto Franke, now a *privat-docent* in the Berlin University. The title of his paper is "The case-system of Pāṇini compared with the use of the cases in Pāli and in the Aśoka inscriptions." He builds upon the foundation laid by Liebich, adopting the latter's scheme of Paninean case-uses, and looking for correspondences to them in the dialects confessedly later than Pāṇini, as the Brāhmaṇa was confessedly earlier. Here also he finds all the agreement that could reasonably have been expected; and, as the ground has been comparatively little worked over, his work is much more truly a contribution to the syntax of the dialects of India than is that of Liebich. He brings to light one very curious thing; that for a problematic rule of Pāṇini's, declaring the future tense to be usable in describing something recently past, examples are quotable from the Pāli, though they have never been discovered in Sanskrit. But his general views as to Pāṇini and the Sanskrit seem rather strange. He calls Liebich's little work "a beginning toward the accomplishment of the very pressing task of determining by internal evidence Pāṇini's position in the literature, and so, indirectly, that of the Sanskrit"—as if nobody, before the appearance of this doctorate-dissertation, had done anything worthy of mention in that direction; or as if the position of Pāṇini's Sanskrit in the history of development of Indian language had not long been clear enough. And he points out that, in spite of the partial agreement between the case-uses in the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa and Pāṇini's rules, we ought not to conclude that the Brāhmaṇa was the exclusive, or even the principal, foundation of the rules—as if it could ever enter into the mind of any reasonable person to draw such a conclusion. He then gives us the same warning in regard to the Pāli, which is even, if possible, more superfluous. He further admits it as possible, though on the whole less probable, that Pāṇini may have "collected the phenomena of very diverse dialects, and fused them together into an integral whole"—than which nothing could well find less to be said in its favor.

But to the question as to what the Sanskrit of Pāṇini really is the same author returns in a special paper entitled "What is

Sanskrit?”, dated in November, 1889 (though first published in vol. XVII, 1891, of Bezzenberger’s *Beiträge*). Rather more than half the paper is occupied with the more specific inquiry as to what Pāṇini means by *bhāṣā*, a word that he uses only seven times, or too seldom to set forth its significance with the desirable clearness. ‘Popular speech’ is its natural sense; but the usages quoted from it by Pāṇini as opposed to his own approved language show that it was no Prakritic dialect (that is the chief result of the author’s investigation); and it is as evidently not one of the older Vedic dialects; there seems to remain, then, only one possibility: it is essentially Sanskrit, only not what Pāṇini accepts as good Sanskrit; it includes those words and phrases which, though more or less current, he does not regard as worthy to be perpetuated. This conclusion appears to be a reasonable and safe one.¹ The second half of the paper then deals more directly with the inquiry as to what Pāṇini’s Sanskrit really is; and the author’s opinion is expressed in these terms (pp. 75–76): “Pāṇini’s Sanskrit is accordingly in the main *bhāṣā*. And yet, on the other hand, it is neither *bhāṣā* nor a living language.” This is not particularly clear; nor is it made very much clearer by the reasonings, and the quotations of the views of others, that follow. It is to me so strange as fairly to be called unaccountable that these authors take no notice whatever of the evidence of the dramas upon the subject. In the latter we see a condition of society in which educated people talk Sanskrit, while the uneducated talk Prākṛit, in dialects more or less different from one another. So far as I can perceive, there is not any reason to question that this state of things was real at the time when those dramas were produced which then set the rule for all future time. The speakers all understand one another; the difference between Sanskrit and Prākṛit is not yet sufficient to prevent that; the Prākṛit-speakers can even, in an emergency, put in a phrase of Sanskrit; and, on the other hand, when King Purūravas goes mad, he casts off the restraints of education, and talks in part Prākṛit, like a woman. That, now, is just the present character of Sanskrit: an educated or learned dialect, kept in existence, nearly unchanged, by instruction, by learned and literary use, among languages now become so diverse from it that its knowledge is confined to a very small circle; such, too, has been its

¹ It is, however, rejected by Liebich, in his ‘Kāṣikā’ (p. xxv), to be described further on. Liebich suggests no substitute.

character for at least two thousand years, while the true vernaculars have been growing further and further away from it; and such must unquestionably have been its character at the outset, when their divergence, and its separate life, first began. That it was itself originally a vernacular seems to me a matter of course; nor do I see that any one has the right to say that Pāṇini's speech was not a living one, unless he then enters into a full explanation of what he means by a living language as distinguished from it. Sanskrit was the natural successor of the dialects of Veda, Brāhmaṇa, and Sūtra, and as much "living" as any of these had been, when the literary and learned class took it in hand, and, with the aid of grammatical science, fortified it against the further effect of the changes that were bringing out of it the various Prakritic dialects (taking that word in its widest sense). There is no absolute line to be drawn between living and dead languages. If the Sanskrit has never failed of being kept up by a constant tradition from teacher to pupil, though in a limited class, there is a real sense in which it has never died, but is still a living tongue. In another and equally correct sense, no language is alive that is not an out-and-out vernacular, spoken by a whole community, and having no inferior dialect below it in the same community; in this sense, to be sure, the Sanskrit of the series of grammarians of whom Pāṇini was the chief and virtually the last was not a fully living tongue; it had Prakritic dialects under it. Moreover, as soon as it took on the character of a learned dialect, it began as a matter of course to be stiffened into something a little unnatural; no dialect ever fell into the hands of grammarians without suffering from their pedantry. But I can find no reason whatever for supposing that it was not their own language, the language which they themselves spoke and which they thought alone worthy to be spoken by others, that they set themselves to describe. Whatever Pāṇini's special original part in the work may have been, we know that he left it still abounding in errors, both of omission and of commission; the important additions and corrections of Kātyāyana and Patanjali, to say nothing of their numerous but more insignificant successors, amply prove this; and it is frankly conceded in many points by these latest students of the system, unlike the scholars of a generation or two ago. The task Pāṇini attempted was beyond the power of mortal man to accomplish, especially in the form adopted by him—which is one that no sensible man should ever have chosen, yet on account of which,

it is very likely, his contemporaries and successors especially admired him, and made him their supreme authority.

Something like this, in my opinion, is what we have a right to say that we know about Pāṇini; and the investigations of Liebich and Franke, while they bring nothing to light that contradicts it, merely illustrate here and there a point in it, and do not add notably to its amount, because they ignore it all, and assume that the most fundamental facts involved have still to be established. What we really need further is added precision on a host of points as to which we have as yet only general knowledge, and particularly a comprehension of how the grammatical system, in all its details, stands related to the language of the Sanskrit classical literature, which professes to be governed by it, and yet has evidently had a traditional life of its own, simply regulated by the grammar, and has by no means been produced under the latter's dictation. To ask and answer, in all seriousness, such questions as whether a certain Brāhmaṇa, or whether the Pāli, is Pāṇini's Sanskrit, or whether that language was a living one, appears to me the wrong way to arrive at any valuable result.

In his conspectus of the views of various scholars as to the character of Sanskrit, given in the second part of his paper, Dr. Franke quotes with approval and acceptance an old expression of opinion by Weber, made at the very outset of his career, to the effect that "the development of Sanskrit and of the Prakrit dialects out of their common source, the Indo-Aryan mother-tongue, went on with absolute contemporaneousness (*vollständig gleichzeitig*)."

But I do not see why this is not an unscientific and untenable proposition. For example, *pakkhitta* and *attā* or *appā* are not contemporaneous with *prakṣipta* and *ātmā* in the historical development of language, any more than Ital. *rotto* and *rotti* with Lat. *ruptus*, -*um* in their various case-forms; and so *hodu* is preceded in point of time by *bhavatu*, being a later "corruption" of the latter, coming to take its place, as Fr. *étail* of *stabat*, or *fûtes* of *fuistis*. And this is true of the great mass of Prakrit words, forms, and constructions; they are developed later than, and come to be substituted for, the corresponding Sanskrit words, forms, and constructions. If there were anything to be found on Indian ground that is earlier than *prakṣipta*, and from which it and *pakkhitta* should have equally descended by a parallel process, then we might have a right to speak of their contemporaneity; but that is plainly not the case; it is the

Sanskrit forms themselves, and not something older and more primitive than Sanskrit, that the Prakrit words presuppose; they have passed through the stage which the Sanskrit represents. That here and there exceptions are met with, altered items for which the original is not found in Sanskrit, or is found in Vedic Sanskrit, is without any force whatever as against the great mass of material of a contrary character; such exceptions to the descent *in toto* of one dialect from another are the rule in all dialectic history, and might with equal justice be relied on to prove that Italian and French are in their development "absolutely contemporaneous" with Latin. As the other half or side of the view already quoted, Dr. Franke adds: "That the Sanskrit had become extinct when the Prakrit dialects first began to develop themselves is false." What this means is quite unintelligible; it seems to go out of the way to deny a doctrine which no well-informed student of language could by any possibility think of maintaining, and it accordingly has no claim to be criticized, but must be simply set aside as valueless. If, for example, *ātmā* had ever become extinct, whence should *attā* or *appā* have originated? Who would say that the egg had been extinct when the chicken first began to develop itself? But, somehow or other, those whose ancestors had said *ātmā* began to say *attā* instead, the one pronunciation passing into the other, with no extinction intervening. It was, however, only a part of the community who did thus; a part, doubtless much the smaller one, continued to say *ātmā*; and the two forms went on in currency side by side, as educated and as popular speech, in the same way as in many cases elsewhere in the world; and *ātmā* was Sanskrit, and, with some help and some mishandling on the part of grammarians, has maintained itself in being to this day, in the literature which we call Sanskrit, and which, rather than the grammarians' treatment of it, is the true and proper object of the study of the Sanskrit scholar.

Next was produced by Dr. Liebich, in 1891, a valuable collection of studies entitled "Pāṇini: a contribution to the knowledge of Indian literature and grammar"; it makes a small octavo volume of 164 pages. The first study, or chapter, deals with Pāṇini's period; the author reviews briefly the opinions that have been held by different scholars respecting the matter, and, without attempting to bring any new evidence to bear upon it, comes to the moderate and sensible conclusion that only a certain degree

of probability can be arrived at: "after Buddha and before Christ" represents to him the measure of this probability. The second chapter treats of the principal later grammarians who have continued and modified Pāṇini's work; in regard to the earliest and most important of them the same chronological uncertainty prevails. The third is entitled "Pāṇini and the remaining literature," and is an attempt to determine where in the succession of the ancient literature of India, from the earliest Veda down, Pāṇini comes in. It takes as starting-point the wild views of Goldstücker, with their refutation by Weber; it points out further the insufficiency of the evidences relied upon for the prevailing opinion that Yaska is earlier than Pāṇini; and it then proceeds to its principal task, of applying to the general question a new, a numerical-statistical, method of solution. The author counts off, namely, a thousand personal verb-forms occurring in succession in each of four different monuments of the literature—the Aitareya-Brahmaṇa, the Bṛhad-Araṇyaka, two Gṛhya-Sūtras (Aṣṭalāyana and Pāraskara), and the Bhagavad-Gītā: representatives respectively of the Brāhmaṇa, Upanishad or later Brāhmaṇa, Sūtra, and epic stages of development of Indian speech—and then applies to them the rules of the grammar, to see how many and what forms unauthorized by Pāṇini appear in the several texts. The examination is creditable to the industry and learning of its author, and its results are interesting; we can hardly go further than that and pronounce them important. For they are essentially illustrative only; they put in a numerical form peculiarities which were already familiarly known to characterize the different classes of works instanced. Not a new item, so far as I can see, is brought to light; nor is any made more certain than before. Thus, six of the seven classes of Brāhmaṇa divergencies drawn out on pages 23-4 have long been recognized as such; and how many examples of each class may chance to occur in a given amount of text is a matter of indifference. As for the seventh, represented by a single case, the lengthened final of the imperative *kṛdhi*, it is an error; such a protraction does not belong to the Brāhmaṇa language, as, indeed, it has no right of occurrence anywhere except in verse; where it appears here (ii 2. 21), it is simply copied from the Rig-Veda verse (i 36. 14) on which the Brāhmaṇa is engaged in commenting, and of which it repeats a whole *pāda* (including *kṛdhi*) with merely the substitution of the more regular *caraṇāya* for *carathāya* in it; and the retention of the *i* is not improbably even

a misreading, such as this Brāhmaṇa has in no very small number (it may be added that the author, doubtless misled by Pāṇini, describes *kr̥dhi* falsely as a present instead of an aorist imperative). And so also in each of the remaining cases. That is to say, the matter is not one to which the numerical method of investigation is well suited; this would be much better applied between, for example, different texts of the same class, as different Brāhmaṇas, to see whether it would yield any evidence as to their respective periods; and perhaps the part of the whole investigation which is of most value is the comparison which it makes possible between Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa and Bṛhad-Araṇyaka, the latter being part of a Brāhmaṇa also, but plainly later, as was a matter of course for an Upanishad. Instead, again, of the Bhagavad-Gītā, which no one doubts to be a comparatively recent addition to the Mahābhārata, it were much to be wished that the author had selected something out of those parts of the epic which are most probably to be regarded as its original nucleus, in order to cast more light upon the really difficult and hitherto doubtful question how and how much the epic differs from the classical or Paninean Sanskrit, and why. That Brāhmaṇa and Upanishad and Sūtra antedate Pāṇini we knew just as certainly before this investigation was made as we know it now; the posteriority of the Bhagavad-Gītā, again, could hardly have been questioned, however the case may stand with the earliest epic. The criteria applied to the divergences of the Gītā from grammatical strictness are of a less satisfactory and decisive character. The decided majority (21 against 16) of the irregularities concern the voice of the verb; but, though the looseness of at least the later epic in this regard is certainly excessive, it is likely that Pāṇini's rules limiting the employment of the voices are exceptionally artificial and discordant with genuine usage; our author himself so judges examples of them (e. g., p. 28) in connection with the Brāhmaṇa. As for the causative perfects with *āsa* (3 in number), Pāṇini's failure to authorize them must be either an oversight or a piece of pedantry. And *ḥucas*, since this aorist occurs in Veda and Brāhmaṇa, might be deemed a sign rather of antiquity than of modern date. The harvest of results from the chapter, then, must be confessed a rather scanty one.

In the sixth and seventh chapters the author returns to the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa and the Bṛhad-Araṇyaka, in order to see whether any difference of period can be established among their

constituent parts. Here again is, as in the particular noted above, a good and suitable application of the statistical method, and it leads to trustworthy and interesting conclusions. In the Aranyaka are discovered no notable indications of diversity of age; but in the Brāhmaṇa the author finds good reason to believe, as had been inferred by others before him, that the concluding chapters are more modern than the rest.

Between the parts of the volume devoted to the first and to the second examination of these two works intervene a couple of chapters, of which the former, the fourth, is headed "Pāṇini's relation to the language of India"—that is to say, the relation of Pāṇini's Sanskrit to the other dialects. The chapter is chiefly composed of a succinct statement of the views of other scholars, to which the author then appends his own view; and this is simply a summary of what he has illustrated in the preceding chapters as the relation between Pāṇini's dialect and the Brāhmaṇa and Sūtra on the one side and the epic on the other. Then (p. 50) he appends as final result a wholly new and original classification of the entire body of dialects of India. They are divided into three categories: pre-classical, classical, and post-classical. To the classical division are referred, besides "the doctrine of Pāṇini," the Brāhmaṇas and Sūtras also, which the author has himself previously recognized as pre-Paninean! this leaves as pre-classical only "the saṃhitās of the four Vedas." But the third division, the post-classical, is still more wonderfully constructed: besides the "independent" epic, it contains the whole literature which we have been accustomed to know as Sanskrit, namely "Kālidāsa, etc., originated under the influence of the grammar"! What is left to constitute the classical subdivision "b. Doctrine of Pāṇini" is very obscure; it can be only Pāṇini's grammar itself (so that such sentences as *idamo rñil, gāṅkuṭā-dibhyo 'ṇinñit* are classical, as contrasted with Kālidāsa's compositions), and in addition all the works that might, could, would, or should have been written in strict accordance with it, and not merely "under its influence," if there only were any such. Now I had myself, in my former paper, laid stress on the difference between the purely hypothetical "grammarians' Sanskrit" and the Sanskrit of the literature; but I never went so far as to maintain, with Dr. Liebich, that the two even belonged to different prime divisions of the whole history of language in India (thus, II. b. grammarians' Sanskrit; III. b. Sanskrit of the literature).

Just half our author's volume (pp. 82-161) is occupied by two studies which are reckoned as Appendix I and Appendix II. The one is a digest of the teachings of the native grammar (Pāṇini, the Mahābhāṣya, and the Kāçikā) respecting the voice-inflection of the verbal roots, as active or middle or both; the other is a similar digest for the formation of feminine declension-stems from the corresponding masculines. These two appendixes constitute, in my opinion, the substantially valuable part of the volume; they exemplify what needs to be done for all the various subjects included in Pāṇini's treatise. The next step, now, should be to compare in detail the statements thus drawn out with the actual facts of the language as exhibited in the whole series of monuments of the literature, from Vedic down to classical and epic, in order to determine what is the relation between the two, and then what the former, the prescriptions of the grammar, are worth; until that is done, no contribution has yet been made to our knowledge of the language, but only to our knowledge of Pāṇini. It casts a shade of unreality over the whole subject of voice-conjugation that the voices of the thousand or twelve hundred false roots are not less carefully defined by the *dhātupāṭha* than those of the eight or nine hundred genuine ones.

There is left for our consideration only the fifth chapter, in which the author takes up and attempts to answer my own objections, given in my paper of nine years ago, to the confusing of the study of Pāṇini with that of Sanskrit, and the thrusting of the grammarians' dialect into the place in our attention which the real language of the recorded literature ought to occupy. I propose to examine here this reply, and see how effective it is.

Dr. Liebich's first point is, as was my own, the *dhātupāṭha*, or list of roots, which is given as part of the material of the grammar, and really even its foundation, since it is upon them that the rules of the grammar profess to go on and build up the structure of the language—and that not only grammatically but lexically, for the grammar includes the system of derivation, with definition of the modifications wrought in each root-sense and stem-sense by the added suffixes. On this point the author offers a criticism which he is obliged himself to withdraw in the next paragraph: he first accuses me of treating Pāṇini rather unfairly, since the *dhātupāṭha* was the part of his work most likely to be deformed by later corruptions; but then allows that I was perhaps (as is indeed plainly the case) criticizing the whole system of the grammarians

as it lies before us, of which the list of roots objected to forms undeniably an inseparable part. Böhrtlingk gives it in length and breadth in his recent second edition of Pāṇini, finding nothing else to put in its place; and it must have gone hard with him, who knows what in Sanskrit is real and what is sham better than almost any other living scholar, and who has in the Petersburg lexicons done more than any one else to make plain their distinction, to introduce into his work such a mass of worthless rubbish; I hardly comprehend how he should have prevailed on himself to do this without exercising his critical acumen upon it, and separating in some way the false from the true. Our author talks of probable interpolations, and intimates that he deems them posterior to the great trio of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patanjali, acknowledging that my criticisms may be "more or less" applicable to their successors. Well, I should think so; and more rather than less. This free and easy way of disposing of the subject is quite characteristic of the whole guild of partizans of the native grammar. It appears impossible to bring any one of them to stand up and face fairly the question of the *dhātupāṭha*. There are not far from nine hundred real authenticable roots in Sanskrit. We could believe that the uncritical interpolations of later grammarians might add to this number a dozen, or a score, or fifty, or (to take the extreme) even a hundred or two; but it is the wildest of nonsense (only strong expressions suit the case) to hold that they could swell the number to over two thousand! Such increase is thus far wholly unexplained, perhaps forever unexplainable, and certainly most unpardonable; and until it is in some way accounted for the admirers of the Hindu science of grammar ought to talk in very humble tones. If these roots are not the ones recognized by the wondrous three, when and under what circumstances and by whose influence were the additional twelve hundred foisted in, to the abandonment and loss of the old genuine list? The difficulty of explaining this seems not less great than that of supposing the whole two thousand as old as Pāṇini himself; both are hard enough; and, in either event, the taint of falsity attaches to the Hindu system as we know it and are expected to use it.

As concerns the three points of the middle periphrastic perfect, the middle precative, and the secondary passive forms, nothing that the author says tends to change at all the aspect of the case as stated by me: namely, that these are formations which, though

taught by Pāṇini, are wanting in the traditional literary language—as much so as verb-forms from the thousand and more false roots; they belong to the grammarians' Sanskrit alone. Just how much or how little excuse Pāṇini may have had for setting them up, that is a different and a minor question, to be decided finally by the general result of our examination of Pāṇini's way of working, of selecting what he will adopt and what he will reject. To me they seem artificial and pedantic structures, reared on an obsolete and insufficient or misapprehended basis.

The author's well-intended correction of my estimate of *prayoktāse* in TS. ii 6. 2³ as 1st sing. I do not find myself able to accept. The sentence is not, perhaps, absolutely clear; but the presence in it of a *te* 'for thee' is to me a tolerably certain indication that the verb is not 2d sing. ('I will employ to-morrow for thee at the sacrifice,' or 'at thy sacrifice'); no such possessive would be called for (or admissible, I think) if the person were second. And *-tāse* is obviously the true middle analogue to active *-tāsmi*, as *ḡāse* to *ḡāsmi* and the like; while *-tāhe*, as given by the grammarians, is absolutely anomalous, being unsupported, so far as I know, by a single other phonetic fact of the language. That it occurs once (but only once) in the literature, in that very late Vedic document the Tāitt. Aranyaka, whose text is in many parts extremely faulty, is beyond question; but I would put forward the suggestion, as by no means an impossible one, that the form is corrupt, and that the 1st sing. *-tāhe* of the grammarians is founded solely on it. That the native commentary, it may be added, explains *prayoktāse* in TS. as 2d sing. is not of the smallest particle of importance; an expositor schooled in Pāṇini would of course do that, and is capable of doing it against the most incontrovertible evidence to the contrary.

Another matter which the author undertakes to defend against my objections is Pāṇini's determination of the cases where *dh* and where *ḍh* is to be used in the 2d plur. endings *dhvam* and *dhve*. He is so far successful that he is able to show the grammarians' rules to admit in part a different interpretation from that put upon them by the later Hindu authorities, and reported by the European grammars which follow these rather than the language itself. I was careful to allow for this possibility in so flagrant a case, putting in the caveat "if the Hindu grammarians are reported rightly by their European pupils (which in this instance is hard to believe)"; it now appears that a part of the reproach is capable of being

shifted from the shoulders of Pāṇini to those of his later interpreters. But only a part. Pāṇini uses in the first of his two rules one of his customary algebra-like signs, *iṇ*, which is ambiguous, signifying either simply the *i*- and *u*-vowels, or these together with the *r*- and *l*-vowels, the diphthongs, the semivowels, and *h*. But such an ambiguity is itself a palpable blot upon a system that claims to be so precise, and Pāṇini's successors are little to blame, comparatively, if they have chosen the wrong meaning. Then, further, it is and must be equally a matter of uncertainty whether this same *iṇ* is or is not to be carried over by implication from the first to the second rule; and this, again, is a characteristic and a pervading difficulty, running through Pāṇini's entire work, and, as I said in my former paper, involving "a condemnation of the whole mode of presentation of the system as a failure." What are the boasted terseness and exactness of the rules really worth, when in innumerable cases you cannot tell what they mean without first knowing what they ought to mean?—that is to say, when an acquaintance with the facts of the traditional language is necessary in order to the right interpretation of the grammar's *dictum* respecting them? The present is, at the best, a case where the interpreters have been too careless of the facts and the reasons of the facts.

But, whatever improved explanation we may apply to them, there is plenty left to object to in Pāṇini's rules. The 2d pl. precativ middle is plainly declared to end in *ṣiḍhvam* or in *ṣidhvam* according to what letters precede the *ṣ* (which might also be *s*); and this is senseless. If the ending is *-ṣiḍhvam*, it is so because the form is originally *-ṣi-ṣ-dhvam*, with the special precativ sibilant between mode-sign and personal ending, as in 2d and 3d sing., *-ṣi-ṣ-thās* and *-ṣi-ṣ-ta*; if it is, on the other hand, *-ṣidhvam*, this is because, as in 1st persons and 3d plur., no such sibilant is present, and the ending is originally *-ṣi-dhvam*; and no one can speak with certainty upon the point, because, as I have pointed out, not a single example of the form has been brought to light out of the literature, earlier or later (the probabilities are altogether in favor of *ṣi-ṣ-dhvam*, and so *-ṣiḍhvam*); but it is perfectly obvious that what precedes the *-ṣi-* has nothing to do with determining the matter, any more than with determining the presence or absence of the precativ sibilant in the 2d and 3d singular. It is equally plain that in the indicative of the *iṣ*-aorist we must always have *ḍhvam* (which the known texts also always

give), because *-iḍhvam* necessarily results from the combination *-iṣ-dhvam*, without any reference whatever to what may precede the *-iṣ-*; and the interpreters must regulate themselves accordingly, if they wish to save Pāṇini's credit. The author thinks he catches me in an error in saying, as concerns this point, that "all the quotable examples . . . are opposed to their rule," and brings up against me *astoḍhvam* etc. out of my grammar. But this only shows how carelessly or how unintelligently he has read my paper; for it is distinctly allowed there that the rule as given applies correctly to the *s*-aorist, and there is quoted the example *anedhvam* (from *aneṣ-dhvam*; by the way, this example and its like seem to show that *iṇ* in the rule requires to be taken in its wider sense): one of the striking things about the matter was that a prescription suiting well the one aorist had been wantonly extended to include the other, with which it had nothing to do, its application giving in every instance a different form from the theoretically correct one found occurring in the literature.

But Pāṇini undeniably takes the perfect also into his rule, making its 2d plur. ending to be *dhve* or *ḍhve* under the same conditions as those laid down for the aorists. The impropriety of the combination and identical treatment of the two tenses is clear. The aorist has always at the end of the stem a lingual sibilant—*aneṣ-*, *apaviṣ-*—to exercise its euphonic influence upon the *dh* of the ending, while in the perfect there is none such. That is to say, none unless the endings *dhve* and *dhvam* are really by origin *sdhve* and *sdhvam*; and this is a doctrine which has found, and perhaps still possesses, some adherents. But it has no foundation whatever in the actual phenomena of Sanskrit, but solely in these blundering rules of the native grammar. Examples of the 2d plur. perfect, indeed, are of exceeding rarity; I am able at present to point to only a single one (*dadhidhve*, occurring twice in RV.) in the older language. But, if we are to recognize *sdhve* in the perfect, we plainly ought to recognize *sdhve* and *sdhvam* also in the present (indic., impv., and opt.) and imperfect; and then we should not meet with forms like *studhvam*, *jānidhvam*, *bhavedhvam*, *akṛṇudhvam*, but with *studhvam* and so on. It appears, then, that the only way to save Pāṇini's reputation in the matter is to strike the syllable *liṭ* (meaning 'perfect') out of his rule, as unguine; and I would suggest that it was perhaps intruded by the same cunning hand that thrust into the *dhātupāṭha* more than a thousand false roots without being

detected or deterred; this latter trick was evidently by far the harder to execute.

But Dr. Liebich finds two other defenses to make (both on p. 58). For one thing, we are not justified in asking for a reason why *dhvam* should in certain cases be converted into *ḍhvam*. "As if," he exclaims, "we were able in any language whatever to trace everywhere the connection of cause and effect!" Begging his pardon, I assert that, on the contrary, in the combinations of stem and ending in Sanskrit euphony, we do not meet with any effect of which we may not look for a cause with good expectation of finding it. If we came anywhere upon a *ḍhvam* without a discoverable reason, we should question its correctness, and hold it probable that some one had blundered, that the text-tradition was corrupt, or the like. On the other hand, if, as is actually the case, we have no *ḍhvam* for which we cannot show a perfectly good reason (few as, unfortunately, the instances are), and no *ḍhve* at all, and can put against this only the assertion of Pāṇini and his successors and interpreters that such forms ought to occur without any reason, I submit that the sole acceptable conclusion must be that these grammarians, like grammarians everywhere else, have blundered, and need to be corrected.

Our author's remaining plea is one that, it must be confessed, gives a tinge of the comic to the whole discussion. The difference, he points out, between *dh* and *ḍh* is very slight, and it might be unfair to expect Pāṇini in every case to distinguish the one correctly from the other! That is to say, if Pāṇini prescribes a *ḍh* where there is no ground for one, it may be simply the fault of his ear, which caught the sound wrong. Now I have been accused, by the author and others, of insinuating depreciatory things about Pāṇini, but I certainly never went so far as this. If the great grammarian had too dull an ear to distinguish a lingual mute accurately from a dental (like the typical, or mythical, German, who cannot tell *t* and *d* apart), what are all his teachings worth that involve phonetic distinctions? The staff is broken over Pāṇini, and by one of his own partizans.

To conclude (after passing without notice the other points made by me; the most important was the grammarians' derivation of the reduplicated aorist from the causative stem instead of from the root directly), Dr. Liebich takes up my criticism of the Paninean classification of compounds, defending and extolling this classification; and he returns to the same subject, elaborating

his view still further, in the introduction to another later publication, "Two chapters of the Kāçikā."¹ According to him, the true scientific principle of arrangement of compounds, which must be regarded as underlying Pāṇini's scheme, is furnished by syntactical subordination, after the following fashion: 1. In the copulative compounds, as *devamanuṣyās* 'gods-and-men,' neither element is subordinated to the other, but both are coördinate; 2. in the determinatives, the former element is subordinated to the latter, either as a case dependent on it or as an adjective (or its equivalent) qualifying it: examples are *housetop*, *redbird*; 3. in the possessives, both are subordinated together to a word outside the compound, which they jointly qualify in the manner of an adjective: for example, *redhead*, i. e. redheaded, or possessing a red head; then, 4. there remains only one other possibility, namely that the second element should be subordinated to the first, as in *atimātram* 'beyond measure': we might give as English parallel *aboveboard* or *overboard* (also, for the other Hindu variety, consisting of a participle governing a following noun, the English *spendthrift* or *hategood*; of this variety our author makes no account, because it is Vedic, and unnoticed by Pāṇini). If, then, we are told, the subordinated element be represented by a *minus*-sign, and the other by a *plus*, we get thus the four combinations ++, -+, --, +-; and these evidently exhaust all the possibilities of the case. Now this is in the real Paninean style, and proves Dr. Liebich to possess a double portion of Pāṇini's spirit, if he be not the great grammarian himself in the latter's *n*th metempsychosis. Pāṇini would have been proud to adopt it into one of his chapters, together with its algebraic notation, so akin with his own. But our author has to confess that it is not Pāṇini's own scheme; it is only brought out fully and distinctly by a much later successor. Moreover, that Pāṇini's fourth class, the so-called *avyayibhāva* compounds, is by no means limited to examples of the formula *plus-minus*, but includes a number of quite heterogeneous formations. Dr. Liebich is nevertheless confident that he recognized the unique value of the scheme, and had it plainly in mind; only he sacrificed it, "perhaps with a heavy heart" (Kāçikā, p. ix), on the altar of—brevity! This brings to our notice, and in a strikingly illustrative manner, another of Pāṇini's leading characteristics and at the same time greatest weaknesses. The prime object aimed at by him (as in

¹ Zwei Kapitel der Kāçikā, Breslau, 1892, 8vo, pp. xl, 80.

no small measure in the *sūtra*-style everywhere) is brevity, brevity at the cost of every other desirable thing—of theoretic truth, of connection, and, most of all, of intelligibility. The quality may be one that recommended his work to those who had to learn it by rote (though in its degree we have the right to question even that), but it is very much the opposite of a recommendation to us, and cannot but detract very seriously from our approval and admiration. And this especially when we see how capriciously the principle is applied—how many rules are squandered on details of the most trifling consequence, far below others that are omitted; on the quotation of other grammarians (the best way to confute whom was to leave them unnoticed); on the excerption (in more than 200 rules) of scattered particulars out of the Vedic language, which are valueless because they are merely specimens, making no pretense to completeness, while the motive of their selection is in many cases beyond the reach even of conjecture—and so on. If the grammar were sharply examined with reference only to this its leading motive, it would unquestionably be found to teem with matter for unfavorable criticism.

But there is another and more fundamental difficulty lying behind Pāṇini's oversight, or possible sacrifice, in not recognizing the fourth, the *plus-minus*, class of compounds in its true character, and thus rounding out a perfect scheme of classification, namely this: there is no such class; Dr. Liebig and his authorities, the later Hindu grammarians, are deceiving themselves with a false determination and notation; the *avyayibhāva* class, however composed, is not *plus-minus*, but *minus-minus*. By this is not meant that the component parts of such compounds do not stand in a *plus-minus* relation to one another; but so also do those of the ordinary possessives stand in a *minus-plus* relation; and if the possessive is nevertheless really a *minus-minus* compound, so is, for the same reason, the *avyayibhāva*. The copulative compound, composed of two (or more) nouns or adjectives, is itself noun or adjective accordingly, and is properly reckoned as *plus-plus*; the determinative is a noun or adjective with preceding limiting word, and it also is noun or adjective accordingly, and rightly *minus-plus*. It is different with the possessive, because, though this is not less a noun with a preceding limiting word, it has passed through a transformation making of it an adjective, which is to qualify something outside: *mahābāhu* when it means 'a great arm' is determinative or *minus-plus*; but when it means

'having a great arm' it is changed to *minus-minus*. If we represent the adjectivizing influence by *a*, we shall get the equation (*minus-plus*)^a = *minus-minus*, which is good linguistic mathematics; at any rate, it is only in such a way that the possessive comes to be a *minus-minus* compound. But precisely the same is true of the *avyayibhāva*. Taking, for example, the participial compound *ābharad-vasu* 'bringing wealth,' we find it made up of a governing word and its object-noun; but it is not therefore a noun; it has been transformed to an adjective; its accus. sing. and nom. plur. are not *ābharantaṁ-vasu* and *ābharanto-vasu*, but *ābharad-vasum* and *ābharad-vasavas*; it has undergone a similar transformation to that of *mahābāhu*, and it is *minus-minus*; for its formula is again (*plus-minus*)^a = *minus-minus*. But the proper *avyayibhāva* is not an adjective, but an adverb; the phrase *ati mātrām* 'beyond measure' becomes as a compound *atimātram* 'excessively.' Here is plainly involved a similar fusion and transfer to that already described; and, if we represent the adverb-making force by *b*, the proper formula for *atimātram* is (*plus-minus*)^b = *minus-minus*. But in real truth *atimātram* is still further from being a *plus-minus* compound; for to any one who considers the class historically it must be obvious that any such adverb is simply the neuter accusative of an adjective used adverbially, as neuter accusatives, among simple words and compounds of every kind, are wont to be used. For example, the first step from *ati mātrām* is the common adjective *atimātra* 'excessive,' of which the formula is (*plus-minus*)^a; then from this comes by another transfer the adverb, with the formula ((*plus-minus*)^a)^b, or, more briefly, (*plus-minus*)^{ab}; and, as the adjective was *minus-minus*, the adverb is doubly so. Whether this double transfer be accepted or not (of course the acceptance does not imply that some of the adverbs have not been made directly, by analogy with the others of more regular development), the asserted *plus-minus* class is irretrievably lost, and with it the mathematically exhaustive and regular classification of Sanskrit compounds. It has, indeed, never been found that the facts of language could be reasoned on mathematically; and, whenever the attempt so to treat them is made, we have the right to expect to detect a misapprehension, as in the present case. We may now decline to be touched by the spectacle of Pāṇini's "heavy heart," and hold, on the contrary, that Dr. Liebhich has probably done him for a second time signal injustice, in believing him

capable of being deceived by an alluring though false theory. The adjective compounds with governing prior member, whether this be preposition or participle, are sub-classes, with the possessives, of the great class of secondary adjective compounds, as I have located and described them in my grammar; and the *avyayibhāvas* are no class of compounds at all, but only a group in the long list of adjective neuter accusatives used adverbially.

It may be further mentioned, as a curiously characteristic point, that our author objects (Kāçikā, p. xi, note 2) to the name "possessive" as applied by Bopp and his successors to the "much-rice" (*bahuvrihi*) compounds, because some of them admit of being fairly rendered otherwise than by 'having' or 'possessing,' and because the Sanskrit has no verb 'have,' and therefore Pāṇini would not have cast the sense into this form. Then also, it may be inferred, we are wrong to speak of the "possessive" suffixes *in* and *vant*, and to render *balin* and *balavant* by 'having strength,' or to call *madiya* 'my' a "possessive" pronominal adjective or *tasya* 'his' a "possessive" genitive. It may be pleaded in reply that, since we name them in our own language and not in Sanskrit, we have every right to cast their real and undeniable sense into the form of nomenclature that best suits our expression; and that the Hindus themselves put the idea of possession as well as they can into the definitions of these compounds by their familiar formula *yasya . . . sa tathoktaḥ*: they say, for example, "whose arms are great" in place of our "having great arms": and it really seems to amount to the same thing.

At the close of his chapter, Dr. Liebich, conceiving himself to have broken the force of all my objections to setting Pāṇini above the Sanskrit literature, and his grammatical science above ours, regrets that I have not brought forward a happier selection of them. I, on the other hand, think myself justified in maintaining that, as they all still stand in full vigor, they are a sufficient illustration and support of my contrary estimate of the native grammar. But I am willing to add another point, which he indeed almost forces upon my attention. At the very end, namely (p. 61), he lifts up hands of horror at me (as did Speijer, in his Sanskrit Syntax, p. 189, note) for daring to stigmatize as a barbarism something which Pāṇini expressly teaches (his alarm makes him see it as double, or worse than double, and he puts it in the plural, as a thing happening "occasionally"). He ought fairly to have quoted the case, instead of merely referring to the

rule about it. It is this: Pāṇini teaches that a comparative and superlative adverbial ending may be added to a personal verb: thus, *dadāti* 'he gives,' *dadātitarām* 'he gives more,' *dadātitamām* 'he gives most.' This is precisely as if one were directed to say in Greek *διδωσιτερον* (in this case, even the suffix is identical) and *διδωσιτατον*. Now I maintain, and without any fear of successful contradiction, that such formations, no matter who authorizes them, are horrible barbarisms, offenses against the proprieties of universal Indo-European speech. The total absence of anything like them, or of anything suggesting even remotely the possibility of forming them, in the pre-Paninean language (one might just as successfully seek for suggestions of *διδωσιτερον* in Homer or Plato), and their rarity later (no example of *-tamām* is ever met with), among writers to whom a rule of Pāṇini is as the oracle of a god, is enough to show that they never formed any proper part of the language. Probably they were jocose or slangy modes of expression (essentially *bhāṣā*, but far below the level of decent *bhāṣā*), which some strange freak, perhaps of amusement at their oddity (and Pāṇini was entitled to some compensation for the "heavy heart" which his subserviency to brevity often cost him), led him to sanction—if indeed the rule permitting them be not another interpolation by that mischief-maker who spoiled the list of roots.

Dr. Liebig complains of the (presumably disrespectful) references to "the native grammarians" which he finds too frequent in my Sanskrit grammar, and kindly advises me to cast them all out. But this is in the highest degree unreasonable. Considering the place which those grammarians have long occupied in the study of the language, and the influence allowed them by their European successors, and that their ways of viewing and presenting things have determined in large measure the form of universal Sanskrit grammar, it is simply impossible to leave them out of account and unmentioned. I am sure I have been as respectful to them as I possibly could, and probably in the majority of cases quite successfully—at least hypothetically respectful, stating their teaching for what it may be worth, and leaving to the future the final determination of its value. It was hardly respectful for him, on his part, to pronounce (in his closing sentence) all my references to them "extremely superficial and often inaccurate," without quoting a single instance to show that they really bear that character. Perhaps, if he had done so, he would have made as signal a failure of it as he has of the attempt to refute the views and reasonings of my former paper.

An extended review of Liebich's Pāṇini, by Dr. Franke, is found in the Gött. Gelehrte Anzeigen bearing date of Dec. 1, 1891 (pp. 951-83). It is, however, less a detailed examination and criticism of the former's views than an independent discussion of some of the points involved, carried on with much learning and acuteness. Many pages are expended upon Pāṇini's classification of the compounds; and here Dr. Franke is far from supporting Liebich's answer to my criticisms; on the contrary, he takes my side, setting forth the remarkable superficialities and incongruities of Pāṇini's work in this department, especially as regards the asserted class of *avyayībhāvas*; he makes many points of detail which I have passed without notice in the above discussion of the theoretic groundwork of the classification. Though dated in the following year, Liebich's Kāçikā and its introduction were doubtless written before the appearance of this review; he would hardly have ventured to repeat his views, or would have cast them into a very different form, if he had had before his eyes their condemnation by a fellow-partizan of Pāṇini. In other points, Franke's notice of Liebich's work is mainly laudatory. Thus, he "thoroughly approves," as "very successful" (p. 962), the latter's futile pleadings as to the ending *ḍhvam* (including, I suppose, the suggestion of Pāṇini's dullness of ear), adding, as his own contribution to the controversy, that a *ḍh* not seldom takes the place of *dh* in Prākṛit, and that Prakritic changes have been known to work their way into Sanskrit. But what has that to do with Pāṇini's definite prescription of *ḍh* in certain conditions which demonstrably have nothing to do with the matter? So in Prākṛit, in obedience to the same general lingualizing tendency, *n* in the majority of cases becomes *ṇ*; but that would be far from supporting a Hindu grammarian who should teach that a *r* altered the next following *n* to *ṇ* only provided it were itself preceded by the sounds included in the designation *ṇ*. As for the great question of the 1200 false roots, Dr. Franke slips smoothly over it, merely echoing the other's remark, that it was an "unfortunate proceeding" on my part to commence from that quarter my attack upon the native grammar. Unfortunate, indeed; but evidently unfortunate only for the grammar: who could help starting from that most flagrant, wanton, and inexcusable of all its many weak sides?

It is hardly worth while to say much more than has been already said with regard to Liebich's Kāçikā. It is a laborious and useful contribution to the study of Pāṇini himself and of one

of the most noted comments upon his work, smoothing a little the way to their comprehension for those who shall approach it hereafter. The author's method is a narrowly restricted one; the rule of Pāṇini is given, not translated, and then follows a bald rendering of the Kāçikā's exposition, with here and there brief notes added on one and another point in the latter; from any attempt at an independent explanation, and yet more from any criticism, the author carefully refrains. Thus, of the rule which introduces the whole subject, *samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*, the Kāçikā gives two entirely discordant interpretations, illustrating, however, only the latter of them—which is a very strong indication that the commentators were themselves uncertain as to what meaning really lay hidden in its obscurity; and the translator passes the matter without a word of remark, nor does it occur to him to state whether in his opinion we ought to understand 'a word-rule is competent,' or to force into the text with extreme violence the sense 'a word in the following rules is to be taken in connection with its sense': it is only an illustration of the ordinary principle that you must first find out what a rule of Pāṇini ought to signify, and must then, at whatever cost, interpret that signification into it. And the continuation is of a piece with the beginning. No one can well avoid being moved to repugnance by the fantastic obscurity with which the subject is presented; and we know already that the underlying theory, the scheme of distinctions and of classification, is a very defective one. To claim, then, that it must be all labored through by the general body of students of Sanskrit, in order that they may duly understand the subject of Sanskrit compounds, is obviously unreasonable, not to say absurd. Pāṇini and his chief commentators must be worked over by a small class of specialists, and not simply translated—that is a mere beginning of the task—but brought into such a form as to be readily understood and assimilated by the mass of scholars. The study is excessively difficult, and on many of the points involved in it certainty seems unattainable. Dr. Liebich confesses (p. i) that he found the rendering of these two little chapters so hard that he could scarcely keep his courage up to complete the task. Speijer has been a faithful student of the native grammar; but of the discussions and criticisms of points in it on which he occasionally ventures in his Sanskrit Syntax, Böhtlingk (in a review of the work in Z. D. M. G. XLI 179 ff.) claims to refute nearly every one; and now Liebich (Kāçikā, p. iv) declares

Böhtlingk, in spite of his life-long familiarity with the subject and his immense erudition, to have translated Pāṇini sometimes incorrectly. Rather discouraging that for a student who is ambitious to get his knowledge of Sanskrit directly from native sources!

I would be far from saying anything to discourage the study of Pāṇini; it is highly important and extremely interesting, and might fairly absorb much more of the labor of the present generation than has been given to it. But I would have it followed in a different spirit and for a different purpose and in a different method. It should be thoroughly dissociated from the study of Sanskrit, though never without recognition of what it may finally contribute to our knowledge of Sanskrit in addition to what we derive from the literature. As to what the literature contains, we need no help from the native grammar; it is the residue of peculiar material that we shall value, and that we should strive to separate from the mass. And the study should be made a truly progressive one, part after part of the native system being worked out to the last possible degree and the results recorded, so that each generation be not compelled to begin anew the tedious and unrewarding task.

At the beginning of the introduction to his *Kāçikā*, it is true, Liebig makes the claim that all Sanskrit students need to master Pāṇini, if for no other reason, because the native commentaries cannot be otherwise completely understood, it being known that they abound more or less in references to the grammar and demonstrations founded upon it. There would be more in this consideration if the grammatical discussions were not precisely the most worthless part of the comments, which can be in all cases neglected with least fear of loss. What the words mean, what allusions they contain, what is to be supplied to complete the sense, which of possible constructions is the right one—these are matters in regard to which the aid of the commentator is more or less (in proportion, namely, to the artificiality of the composition) welcome, sometimes even indispensable; but for the grammatical forms, the derivations, and everything else that Pāṇini can be quoted for, the case is different. As for Sāyaṇa and his kind, even those who make the strongest claims in his favor will hardly venture to deny that the whole grammatical part of his exposition might be expunged from his text without loss of a jot or tittle of its value.

It may be added that Dr. Franke also, in the first paragraphs of his review of Liebig briefly examined above, shows the same

disposition to exaggerate and misrepresent the claims of Pāṇini to attention. He quotes once more, as Liebig had done before him, Lassen's unworthy insinuation that Bopp's growing independence of Pāṇini was owing to his ignorance of him! As if Bopp did not know Pāṇini, both at first hand and in his European representatives, sufficiently to judge with full competence what his system was worth, and how far it required to be followed! There is quite too much of Pāṇini left still in Bopp's grammar; yet to Bopp belongs the high credit of making the recorded facts of the language for the first time the basis of their orderly presentation, and of bringing the principles of European grammatical science, and those of a new and developing comparative grammar, to bear upon Sanskrit. It is owing to this that he became the real Sanskrit teacher to Europe, in a manner and degree far beyond the reach of Lassen. Dr. Franke then goes on to vindicate for Pāṇini various things to which he has not the shadow of a just title: as, 1. that not only for Sanskrit, but also for other Aryan dialects and writings, Pāṇini is of indispensable importance—which apparently means nothing more than that some of the phenomena of dialects later than Sanskrit are to be found noted in his grammar; 2. that the study of his rules has a formally educating influence—which is, I think, just the opposite of the truth, since their method is purely mechanical, sacrificing everything else to brevity, ignoring connection and proportion, lacking all recognition of the historical element, and therefore necessarily destitute of philosophy (we have seen above that too much Pāṇini has led Dr. Liebig to doubt the relation of cause and effect in Sanskrit euphony); 3. that it is Pāṇini who has taught us to regard every word, every ending, even every letter as important—which is an accusation laid without any reason whatever against western grammatical science; and 4. that Pāṇini is going to aid literary chronology in a way that is hitherto for the most part only a matter of conjecture and of future hope—and which therefore, we may answer, it is as yet too early to say anything about; but, if there are such treasures hid in Pāṇini, why do not his partizans devote themselves to bringing them forth, instead of dwelling upon subjects which are far better understood out of the literature itself?

Just forty years ago, a German student of more than ordinary ability, in company with whom I had worked for a season under a professor of the highest eminence in Germany, took the degree

of doctor of philosophy creditably with a dissertation on one of Kālidāsa's plays, and went to England for further study and for employment. He was fortified, among other things, with a letter of introduction to a Sanskrit scholar of German birth, then long resident in London. This scholar, on being consulted in regard to plans and pursuits, told him that all his hitherto acquired knowledge had no real foundation, and was essentially worthless; that, if he wished to accomplish anything, he must drop all besides and devote himself for two or three years exclusively to the study of Pāṇini; when that had been done it would be time to talk of something else. Just how much this rebuff had to do with turning my friend's attention away to other studies I do not know; but, at any rate, until his death some years after he was not heard of further in Sanskrit.

Such was, doubtless in its most intense form, the spirit of the devotees of the native Hindu grammar a generation ago. And, though it has been in some measure subdued since, it is by no means extinct, when a man of real learning and ability like Dr. Franke can still maintain (in his *Casuslehre*, etc., noticed above, p. 68, or p. 6 of the reprint) that our profounder knowledge of Sanskrit is to be especially proportioned to our deeper penetration into Pāṇini's teachings—against which is to be set, as antidote, the same author's exposure of Pāṇini's failure in the article of compounds. It is, of course, much to the credit of Pāṇini that he exercises such a bewildering fascination over the minds of those who involve themselves in the labyrinth of his rules—though the influence admits, I believe, of a natural explanation. I am fully persuaded that any one who should master the Hindu grammatical science without losing his head, who should become thoroughly familiar with Pāṇini and escape being Pāṇini-bitten, would be able to make exposures of the weaknesses and shortcomings and needless obscurities of the grammar on a scale hitherto unknown.

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